Rational Philosophy

On the philosophy of pragmatism: Or, when concept meet conception.

A zealous, Alabama district attorney has been going after pregnant mothers who abuse drugs. As his statutory weapon Greg L. Gambril uses a law that punishes “chemical endangerment of a child,” which was introduced, primarily, to protect children from exposure to meth labs. “When drugs are introduced in the womb, the child-to-be is endangered,” Mr. Gambril said. “It is what I call a continuing crime.” Gambril betrays no compunction about removing mothers from their babies.

On economic policy, Fed chief Bernanke, once a professor of economics, started out in his new job with a belief in the ability of the markets to respond rationally, and a hands-off approach to new financial instruments and odd turns of events. The real world seems to have influenced Bernanke’s thinking. In recent weeks he’s begun to act in ways that contradict his earlier statements — shoring up the ailing Bear Stearns, cutting rates multiple times, and making risky loans to keep the markets from further floundering.

And, to profanity: both Fox and the FCC seem happy that the Supreme Court will be reviewing the FCC’s attempt to tighten its policies on profanity. The FCC wants to be able to go after the networks for “fleeting expletives.” And the networks want to protect themselves against such actions. This momentous legal event is sparked by expletives uttered by Bono at the 2003 Golden Globes, and by Cher and Nicole Richie during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards. I can’t repeat what they said… Well actually, I guess I can. Bono said “fucking brilliant,” Cher said “Fuck ‘em,” and Nicole Richie said “Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.”

Richie is the clear winner.

A common aspect to these three stories seems to be the concept of pragmatism. In each one, pragmatism represents the fulcrum around which decisions or choices need to be made.

Pragmatism can be a deceptive concept. It gets bandied about as a compliment. “It was a pragmatic decision,” people say. Or, “he is clearly the more pragmatic.” But pragmatism is in the eye of the beholder. Alabama DA Gambril doubtless believes that he is exhibiting pragmatism by upholding the spirit of the law and very literally introducing separation between children and chemical exposure. Others argue that Gambril’s efforts do more harm than good because they don’t help the mother and separate mother and child during a critical period in the child’s development.

Likewise, the same people who today praise Bernanke for his pragmatism — the jumpy executives fearing collapse — would criticize him if he were to exert greater central control and influence during sunnier times. They see Bernanke as pragmatic because they like what he’s doing.

And I expect that the 550,000 people who’ve complained to the FCC about “fleeting expletives” would praise the pragmatism of the FCC’s new policies, whereas those who got a good giggle out of Nicole Ritchie’s colorful, cow shit complaint probably think that the policies against expletives are already somewhat unpragmatic.

So, can we make a pragmatic decision that isn’t, by definition, subjective?

Unfortunately, as with most things worth doing, it’s not easy. Firstly, it is important to understand the abstract premise against which pragmatic decisions will be judged.

In the case of the Alabama drug convictions, DA Gambril might frame this premise as “protecting children from the adverse effects of illegal drugs.” The mothers and their supporters might frame it as “ensuring what’s best for the child’s welfare.”

Immediately, we see that Gambril’s abstraction represents a somewhat narrower frame of thinking. Protecting children from the adverse affects of illegal drugs is just one factor in a more complex set of factors that may ultimately help not just the children in the cases being considered but also other children (by acting as a deterrent, for instance). We can then immediately say that, at least as far as I’ve framed it, Gambril’s perspective only considers one piece of the overall impact of his actions. He cannot therefore be said to be acting completely pragmatically.

Once we’ve understood the abstract premise, the second step in deciding whether something is pragmatic must be to try to determine whether the action being taken warrants us bending the rules.

Bernanke can’t be in a very happy position. I expect that he’s considered the long term impact of his current actions. And I expect that he’s ideologically uncomfortable with some of the steps he’s taken. I would imagine that Bernanke believes that without the actions he’s taking there is a good chance that the country’s financial systems would have collapsed. I can’t think of a better reason for acting against one’s purist beliefs. The only counterveiling reason would have been if Bernanke could convince himself that ultimately the markets would have been better for off for a little collapsing.

And here we come to a curious quirk of pragmatism: When it is justified, pragmatism should lead us to question the very foundation of the principles we’re bending. Bernanke should be realizing through this muddle that his original beliefs were deficient, that the markets can’t be trusted to be rational and sensible.

Lastly, applying these principles to the FCC versus the networks. The FCC regards its proposed policy change as a pragmatic response to the request for action against fleeting expletives from 550,000 members of the public. But the FCC reveals itself to be thinking unclearly when it says that “the ‘F-word’ in any context ‘inherently has a sexual connotation.’”  I’m perplexed as to how to read a sexual connotation into the use of the word fuck or its derivatives when it’s being applied as an adjective or adverb.

But one also can’t necessarily defend the networks by poking holes in the FCC’s argument. The meta-question here seems to be whether, pragmatically speaking, the use of fleeting expletives is more offensive than not, whether the networks are responsible for fleeting expletives or not, and whether there is a reason to allow the FCC to change its expletive policy.

For more rational, science-based explanations of life’s meaning and purpose, please refer to my book: LIFE! Why We Exist… And What We Must Do To Survive.

On the logic or otherwise of war, protest, and reaction.

Today’s current events drew me to think about the philosophy of conflict in all its forms. Further reports of the violent and brutal repression of protests in Kenya, sparked by a reaction against the election results there, university protests against the Catholic church in Rome, Canadian condemnation (through its torture watch list) of inhumane detention and interrogation techniques being used by the US government, and the growing call for shoring up the economy with a stimulus package.

(Putting the economic stimulus package on this list may seem odd. But I deliberately want to stretch the idea of conflict to include “intervention” since it seems to me that the concept of conflict may be subordinate to the concept of intervention. (Another story I could have used as an example discusses Google’s philanthropic appendage — Google.org.))

The Kenyan troubles provide two philosophical questions: Can we logically and rationally examine whether violent protest is justified and under what conditions? And, secondly, can we logically and rationally examine whether harsh and violent suppression of protest is justified and, if so, under what conditions?

Emotionally, if we sense that a group has been wronged, we tend to sympathize with it in its protests. And if the protests meet with harsh suppression, we may even tend to sympathize with some level of violence on the part of the protesters. (This is why Ghandi’s philosophy of passive resistance caused such a stir and continues to stand out in people’s minds. It struck us as odd.) Conversely, if we feel that the group hasn’t been wronged in proportion to the protest, and that general order and safety is threatened by the protesters, we tend to sympathize with the use of some force (short of unwarranted violence) in maintaining order. I realize I’m not speaking for all of society in saying this, but just painting an emotional picture.

Rationally, though, can we justify violent protests or violent action against protests?

The student protests in Rome against the Catholic church raise a similar question without the violence. The Italian protests revolve around some of the incumbent Pope’s ill-chosen and perhaps ill-meant words.

And Canada’s arm’s-length but telling criticism of the US’s recent human rights record by putting the US on its torture watch list provides an example of confrontation that is charged because of the statement it makes rather than the mechanism it employs.

Which brings us to the sluggish economy and the growing support for some kind of stimulus package. Action, reaction. Situation, confrontation.

The concepts involved in confrontation seem to be 1. dissatisfaction with the status quo, and 2. judgment that it is right to act to effect some change to the status quo.

A conscious actors, human beings have gone beyond the simple response to stimuli that governs the actions of non-conscious creatures. Consciousness gives us the power to act against a stimulated response. In other words, we may be dissatisfied with a situation but decide to do nothing to change it. When an animal is moved to anger, it’s natural response may be to act aggressively. As human beings we can choose to act on this response or not.

As to the concept of dissatisfaction, we cannot control it. An adverse situation will either lead to dissatisfaction or it won’t.

Then there’s the question of whether it is right to confront the situation that has caused our disatissfaction, and how we judge this.

To put it simply, in the non-conscious world it is always right to respond according to the stimulus. Whereas, in the conscious world, it may not be right to respond to the stimulus.

The Fed and the politicians concerned about the slump must judge whether it is wiser in the long term to stimulate the economy than to leave it alone. The judgment on whether to confront the slowing economy should rightly take into account the long term economic impact. A confrontation based only on short term fears about a recession would be misguided.

In Rome, the protesters seem to have forgotten about the value of freedom of speech by forcing the Pope to cancel his visit. Their confrontation seems to be based simply on short term anger at his visit rather than long term consideration of what’s best for the country. Perhaps they’d do more for separation of church and state by letting the sinister Ratzinger visit and countering his dubious social theories with elegant rebuttals.

But what of the philosophy of violent protest or suppression of violent protest? Again, it seems that, however abhorrent violence may be, the long term good or ill to society of violence must be weighed against the ill to society of the status quo. From the perspective of the good of humanity it was right and good for the nations of Europe and the US to fight the Nazis. The long term good to the world warranted the violence and loss of life incurred.

In Kenya, is more being gained through the protests than would be gained without them? If I understand the situation, the Kenyan protesters are confronting not just the election of a president they don’t like, but the suspicion of electoral fraud. In which case, for them, the very basis of civilized society is at stake. In which case, if they have good reason for their suspicions, it seems that their confrontation, meeting violence with violence if need be could be judged to be warranted.

Which is not to say that peaceful means of protest in Kenya or elsewhere should be disregarded or abandoned as either weak or ineffective. Far from it. As Ghandi showed, sometimes non-violence can be far more dramatic and dramatically effective than violence.

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